Wednesday, May 6, 2026

The One in which I play Petroleum Economist

 I have some questions about gas prices. When do you expect them to return to normal, i.e. under $3 per gallon. And at what point will we see "demand destruction", which I define as a noticeable drop in GDP caused by 1) people not driving or flying or 2) by not purchasing items that are more expensive because of the extra transportation costs?

Here’s the blunt reality: you’re asking two different questions—price normalization and economic breaking points—and right now they’re moving in opposite directions.


1) When could gas fall back under $3?

Short answer: probably not in 2026, unless something big changes

  • The U.S. average is currently around $4.4–$4.5/gal and rising
  • A key driver is geopolitical disruption (Iran / Strait of Hormuz) choking supply
  • The U.S. Energy Secretary recently said sub-$3 may not happen until 2027

Why prices aren’t falling (despite earlier forecasts)

Earlier in 2026, models expected lower prices due to rising supply . That’s still structurally true—but:

  • Oil is now ~$110+ per barrel vs ~$60–70 expected baseline
  • Supply disruptions are overwhelming the “normal” supply growth story
  • Inventories are tightening going into summer

What would push gas back under $3?

You’d likely need multiple things at once:

  • Resolution of Middle East conflict (biggest factor right now)
  • Oil back down into ~$60–70 range
  • Stable refinery capacity and normal inventories

Without that combination, $3 gas is basically a 2027+ story, not a near-term one.


2) When does “demand destruction” happen?

You defined it well—a real economic slowdown caused by energy costs. The key insight:

๐Ÿ‘‰ We are NOT there yet. Not even close.

Evidence right now:

  • Gas demand is still flat to slightly rising (+1% YoY)
  • Even at $5 gas in 2022, demand barely fell (~0.5%)
  • Analysts say no meaningful demand destruction yet despite big price increases

3) So where IS the breaking point?

There are three different “thresholds,” and they matter differently:

A) Behavioral demand destruction (mild)

People:

  • Drive less
  • Cancel trips
  • Switch to cheaper fuel

Likely range:
๐Ÿ‘‰ ~$4.50–$5.50 gas

We’re just entering this zone now (you’re seeing early signs like reduced travel plans)


B) Economic demand destruction (your definition)

This is where it hits GDP via:

  • Reduced consumption
  • Higher transport costs feeding inflation
  • Lower discretionary spending

Likely range:
๐Ÿ‘‰ ~$5–$6+ sustained gas

Why:

  • Fuel starts meaningfully squeezing household budgets
  • Trucking, airlines, logistics pass costs through broadly

We are approaching this zone but not fully in it yet


C) Hard demand destruction (recession-level)

This is when oil markets actually break demand globally.

  • Some analysts say it may take $150–$200 oil to force this
  • That corresponds roughly to $6–$8+ gasoline

At that point:

  • GDP slows materially
  • Freight demand drops
  • Air travel declines sharply

4) Why demand is so resilient (this cycle)

This part is important and a bit counterintuitive:

  • Gasoline is a smaller % of income than in the past
  • Cars are more fuel efficient
  • Many jobs still require commuting (inelastic demand)
  • People cut other spending first, not driving

So instead of immediate GDP decline, you often get:

“silent demand destruction” → discretionary spending drops before driving does


Bottom line

  • Sub-$3 gas: unlikely before 2027 unless geopolitics resolve quickly
  • Early demand destruction: starts around $4.5–$5 (we’re entering it)
  • GDP-impacting demand destruction: around $5–$6 sustained
  • Recession-level destruction: likely $6–$8+ gas / $150–$200 oil

If you want, I can break this down specifically for Colorado (since prices there are usually below the national average) and what thresholds would hit your local economy first.

What are the odds that we would reach recession-level destruction, which would be oil over $150 per barrel and gas over $6 per gallon, in the next 6 months?

Short answer: possible, but not the base case. A reasonable estimate right now is on the order of 20–35% over the next 6 months for hitting both ~$150 oil and ~$6 gasoline in the U.S.

Let me break down why that’s not higher—and why it’s not negligible either.


What has to happen to reach that level

To get to recession-level demand destruction, you’d typically need:

  • Crude oil ≥ $150/barrel (we’re roughly ~$100–110 now)
  • U.S. gasoline ≥ $6/gallon (currently ~$4.4–4.5)
  • And importantly: stay there long enough (not just a spike)

That requires a major supply shock, not just tight markets.


Scenario breakdown (next 6 months)

1) Base case (most likely) — ~65–75%

  • Oil: ~$90–120
  • Gas: ~$3.75–$5.00

What this assumes:

  • No full closure of the Strait of Hormuz
  • Some supply response (U.S., OPEC+)
  • Demand stays resilient

๐Ÿ‘‰ This is painful but not recession-triggering by itself.


2) Stress case — ~20–30%

  • Oil: $120–150
  • Gas: $5–6

What this assumes:

  • Ongoing geopolitical tension (e.g., partial disruption in the Middle East)
  • Shipping risks, insurance spikes, but not total supply cutoff

๐Ÿ‘‰ This is where you start seeing:

  • Airline cutbacks
  • Reduced freight volume
  • Slower GDP growth

But still not full “hard” demand destruction.


3) Crisis case (your scenario) — ~10–20%

  • Oil: $150–200
  • Gas: $6–8

This requires something like:

  • Major disruption in the Strait of Hormuz
  • Direct conflict involving a major producer like Iran
  • Or a combination of supply loss + panic buying

๐Ÿ‘‰ This is when:

  • GDP contraction becomes likely
  • Travel drops sharply
  • Freight and consumer demand fall

Why the probability isn’t higher

Even with current tensions, there are stabilizers:

1) Spare capacity exists

  • OPEC+ (especially Saudi Arabia) can increase output
  • U.S. shale can respond, though with a lag

2) Governments intervene early

  • Strategic Petroleum Reserve releases
  • Diplomatic pressure to stabilize flows

3) Demand weakens before extremes

  • High prices themselves reduce consumption before $150 is reached
  • That acts like a natural cap

Why the probability isn’t near zero

There are real tail risks:

  • The Strait of Hormuz handles ~20% of global oil
  • Even partial disruption spikes prices fast
  • Markets can overshoot fundamentals due to panic

Historically, oil spikes are non-linear:

  • $110 → $150 can happen much faster than $70 → $110

Timing matters (this is key)

Even if we hit:

  • $150 oil
  • $6 gas

…it might be brief (weeks) rather than sustained.

๐Ÿ‘‰ For true recession-level “demand destruction,” you usually need:

  • 2–4+ months at those levels

That lowers the probability of your scenario meaningfully impacting GDP within just 6 months.


Bottom line

  • Chance of touching those levels briefly: ~20–35%
  • Chance of sustained levels causing real demand destruction: ~10–20%
  • Most likely outcome: elevated but sub-crisis prices

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