The text says: "Fiscal gap has trended around 6% of GDP in recent years".
That's not what I see - I see deficits that are increasing as a percent of GDP that are currently about 6% of GDP and continue to increase as a % of GDP in an unbroken trendline since the year 2000.
I think there is some funky accounting going on at the Department of Education. This is DoD-type obfustication (spell-checker says that word should be obfuscation but I like my spelling).
The latest CBO Monthly Budget Review has this information about rising costs in the Department of Education: Outlays of the Department of Education rose by $41 billion (or 117 percent), driven largely by differences in the amounts the Administration recorded for the estimated costs of outstanding student loans. In September 2025, a reduction of $131 billion was recorded because of program modifications authorized in the 2025 reconciliation act that offset most of the department’s fiscal year 2025 spending. In 2026, the Administration recorded a net decrease in the estimated costs of outstanding loans, mostly stemming from updated assumptions about borrowers’ repayments. That reduction was significantly smaller than the one recorded in 2025, resulting in a year-over-year net increase in outlays. Partially offsetting that net increase for 2026, spending from the Education Stabilization Fund fell by $12 billion and outlays for other components of the department’s budget fell by a similar amount. My question: I don't understand this at all? I thought the monthly budget review was on the cash basis, so the outlays from Education would be disbursements on the loans to schools less payments from borrowers. And of course they measure the amount of student loans outstanding which is somewhere around $7 trillion, but that is an asset; and if they write off some loans that has no effect on cash. But this makes it sound like it is on the accrual basis, which is different from the way the rest of the federal budget is calculated. Can you explain what is going on here?
Your understanding is essentially correct: the federal budget is mostly on a cash basis, but federal loan programs are a major exception. Student loans use an accrual-like method required by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. Consequently, “outlays” in the Monthly Budget Review do not always mean cash paid outside the government. Congressional Budget Office
That exception explains the passage you quoted.
1. What gets counted as student-loan spending?
Instead of counting loan disbursements minus borrowers’ payments as budget outlays each year, the government records the estimated lifetime net cost of the loans, expressed in present-value dollars. That incorporates expected principal and interest collections, defaults, forgiveness, and other repayment provisions. Administrative expenses, such as servicing costs, are counted separately on a cash basis. Congressional Budget Office
Here is a simplified example, excluding administrative expenses:
| Event | Actual external cash movement | Effect on reported budget outlays |
|---|---|---|
| Government makes $100 billion of loans and estimates the present value of future collections at $80 billion | $100 billion paid out | $20 billion subsidy cost |
| Later, revised assumptions raise expected collections’ present value by $10 billion | No immediate external cash movement | Negative $10 billion adjustment |
| Alternatively, revised assumptions lower expected collections’ present value by $10 billion | No immediate external cash movement | Positive $10 billion adjustment |
Those later adjustments are called subsidy reestimates. Changes in loan terms can also produce adjustments to previously recorded costs. Congressional Budget Office
2. Where do the actual loan disbursements and repayments go?
The government maintains two distinct accounts:
The financing account’s cash flows affect Treasury’s borrowing needs, but they are excluded from the reported budget deficit. The subsidy entries involve transfers between government accounts rather than payments to schools or borrowers. Congressional Budget Office
So your proposed calculation—cash disbursements less borrower payments—is meaningful as a measure of cash requirements, but it is not the measure used for student-loan outlays in the budget.
3. What does the CBO passage mean?
Reading the paragraph you supplied:
For illustration only, if other spending stayed at $150 billion, a negative $131 billion adjustment would leave $19 billion in reported outlays. A negative $60 billion adjustment the next year would leave $90 billion. Reported outlays would rise $71 billion without any increase in that other spending.
The actual passage also says ordinary spending declined in two categories, partially offsetting the increase caused by the loan accounting adjustments. The $41 billion increase therefore does not establish that Education paid out $41 billion more cash.
4. Your point about the asset and write-offs is right
Writing down a loan asset does not itself use cash. Under credit reform, however, a reduction in expected collections can increase the reported deficit immediately; the additional borrowing need emerges later as those expected payments fail to arrive. An actual write-off already anticipated in the estimates need not generate another expense. Congressional Budget Office
One numerical correction: outstanding federal student loans are about $1.7 trillion, rather than $7 trillion; the September 2026 Federal Student Aid update puts the federally managed portion above $1.64 trillion. Knowledge Center
You spotted a real accounting distinction: the reported federal deficit combines mostly cash-based spending with present-value accounting for credit programs. It is not a pure cash-flow statement.
What is the current balance of the outstanding federal student loans, and the amount they expect to collect if it is different, and how did that change from the previous year? Sorry for giving you the wrong number.
The latest published balance is more than $1.7 trillion. The latest financial-statement estimate of the government’s loan asset is about $1.29 trillion—but those figures have different dates and coverage.
There are two useful comparisons.
Latest outstanding balances, as of June 30, 2026
| Loan portfolio | June 2025 | June 2026 | Year-over-year change |
|---|---|---|---|
| All federal student loans, including some held by private lenders | $1.67 trillion | More than $1.7 trillion | Nearly 4% increase, according to FSA |
| Federally managed portfolio | About $1.58 trillion | More than $1.64 trillion | Roughly $60 billion increase, using rounded figures |
These are balances owed by borrowers, including accrued interest. The June 2026 figures were published September 22, 2026. Knowledge Center
Latest comparable financial-statement values
For the amount the government expects to recover, the closest published measure is “loans receivable, net.” The latest annual financial statements I found are for September 30, 2025:
| Education Department loan receivables, billions of dollars | Sept. 30, 2024 | Sept. 30, 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Principal owed | $1,445.5 | $1,473.7 | +$28.2 |
| Accrued interest owed | 128.5 | 161.9 | +33.4 |
| Gross amount owed | 1,574.0 | 1,635.6 | +$61.6 |
| Less: allowance for subsidy | (493.0) | (343.3) | Allowance decreased $149.6 |
| Net loan asset—present value of expected future net cash flows | $1,081.1 | $1,292.3 | +$211.2, or 19.5% |
These figures cover loans recorded as Education Department receivables, rather than the entire federal student-loan portfolio. ed.gov
The $1.29 trillion is not a prediction that borrowers will pay exactly $1.29 trillion in total. It discounts projected future cash flows into today’s dollars, including future interest collections and the effects of defaults, forgiveness, and repayment terms. Therefore, the $343 billion difference is not simply an estimate of unpaid principal or loans that will be forgiven. The financial statements do not give an equivalent undiscounted total of expected collections in that table. ed.gov
The striking change is that the amount owed rose about $62 billion, while the estimated net asset rose $211 billion. Much of that larger increase came from accounting changes: the 2025 reconciliation reports approximately $147 billion of loan modifications increasing net receivables, plus about $29 billion from net downward cost reestimates. New lending, payments, and other adjustments account for the rest. Those are broader annual financial-statement amounts, so they should not be equated directly with the specific $131 billion adjustment cited in your CBO passage. ed.gov
Thus, the latest data show both a growing outstanding balance and, in the latest annual valuation, a substantially higher estimated recovery value. I would not compare the June 2026 balance directly with the September 2025 net asset to calculate a current expected-loss percentage.
How did ending the SAVE plan effect this? Maybe it didn't change anything currently because it is still being implemented, but for next year, how much is the expected present value of the loans expected to be vs the expected present value if SAVE was not implemented? In other words, how much more money is ending the SAVE plan expected to bring in in FY 2027?
Ending SAVE increased the estimated value of future loan repayments, and that effect was already substantially recorded in FY 2025—even though borrowers’ transition to other plans came later. But I did not find an official estimate isolating additional cash collected in FY 2027 specifically because SAVE ended.
I’m interpreting your comparison as SAVE continuing versus SAVE being ended and replaced by the available repayment plans.
The closest official estimate I found is in the Education Department’s 2026 repayment regulations:
| Scope of estimate | Estimated reduction in lifetime costs, in present-value dollars |
|---|---|
| Repayment-plan changes affecting existing loans originated in 1994–2025 | $121.8 billion |
| Repayment-plan changes affecting future loans originated in 2026–2035 | $246.5 billion |
| Combined | $368.3 billion |
The comparison baseline included SAVE. However, these figures cover the broader repayment overhaul, including RAP, the new standard plan, and changes to other repayment plans. They do not isolate SAVE’s elimination. The future-loan estimate also incorporates interactions with loan limits. public-inspection.federalregister.gov
For your question about the existing loan asset, the most relevant number is therefore approximately $122 billion more in present-value recoveries from the repayment changes as a package—not $122 billion more collected during one year.
That helps explain the increase in the loan asset I described previously. The Department’s FY 2025 financial report identifies a $131.3 billion downward cost modification from the reconciliation law, covering repayment changes and changes to borrower-defense and closed-school discharge regulations. With an associated adjustment, it reports $147.9 billion in savings from that modification. So neither the $131 billion nor the $148 billion figure should be described as SAVE-only savings. ed.gov
Implementation does not have to finish before the present-value effect is recorded. Credit accounting recognizes changes to outstanding loans when the modifying legislation is enacted, based on projected future repayments. Consequently, FY 2027 collections can increase as borrowers resume payments, while the main lifetime accounting benefit has already appeared in FY 2025. Congressional Budget Office
There are also two different cash comparisons:
Those comparisons would produce different FY 2027 numbers.
The answer I can substantiate is about $122 billion in increased lifetime present value for existing loans from the broader repayment overhaul. I cannot substantiate a SAVE-only FY 2027 cash figure, or a pair of FY 2027 portfolio valuations “with SAVE” and “without SAVE,” from the official material I found. It would also be incorrect to add that $122 billion to the previously reported $1.29 trillion asset: that asset already reflects the enacted changes.
The federal government incurred a deficit of $28 billion in September 2026, CBO estimates, compared with a surplus of $198 billion recorded in September 2025—a difference of $226 billion. Revenues were $14 billion more this September than they were last September; outlays increased by $240 billion.
The federal budget deficit totaled $2.0 trillion [actually $1,993 million] in fiscal year 2026, the Congressional Budget Office estimates, $218 billion more than the deficit recorded in fiscal year 2025.
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-10/61985-MBR.pdf
The debt owed to the public as of 9/30/26 was $32.425 trillion, and the GDP as of 6/30/26 was $32.5 trillion, so the debt to GDP ratio is 99.8%. The GDP numbers for the 3rd quarter of 2026 will be released in about a month and I will update this ratio then.
This ratio was 100% a year ago, based on GDP of $30.3 trillion and debt to the public of $30.3 trillion so it really hasn't changed.
The debt to the public increased by about $2.15 trillion between 9/30/25 and 9/30/26, which is about a 7.1% increase.
My projections are for the debt to the public to increase about $2.1 to $2.2 trillion for the next 4 years, with bigger deficits starting about 2031. The big danger on the horizon is for the Social Security Trust Fund to be depleted about 2033, but I think Congress will just pay the shortfall out of the general fund instead of actually cutting benefits.
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Why were outlays so much higher this year than last? The 3 biggest percent increases were: Department of Education (up 117%); Interest (up 11%); Dept of Veterans Affairs (up 10%).
Why did the Dept of Education spending increase so much? That should be the topic of another post.
The Net Interest on the Public Debt was 1,143 billion in FY 2026, up 115 billion from FY 2026, an increase of 11%.
If this continues to increase at 11% per year, when will it exceed $2 trillion per year? That would be in 2032, about the time that Social Security reform will be very important. So the deficit will really skyrocket after 2032, from the relatively tame $2 trillion per year now, to over $3 trillion per year in 2033 and increasing at least $200 billion per year.
Karl Miller’s latest private assessment, dated September 16 and titled “Judgment Day Has Arrived,” makes a single governing claim about diesel, jet fuel, and kerosene: physical demand is now outrunning promptly deliverable supply. Not the price of the barrel — the delivery of it. In Miller’s framing the market has crossed from a pricing problem, which money solves, to a deliverability problem, which money alone does not. The next phase, he argues, forces buyers to compete not just for fuel but for delivery capacity and for the cash to fund both at once.
I asked my expert, ChatGPT, about this.
Diesel supplies are running low, and in many places diesel prices are over $6 per gallon or not available. The problem will probably get worse before it gets better. What would happen to the US economy if diesel prices go above an average of $8 per gallon and remain there for the next year?
Yes. If the national average diesel price rose above $8/gallon and stayed there for a full year, I would expect a substantial negative shock to the U.S. economy—probably a combination of higher inflation and materially weaker economic growth. Whether it produced an outright recession would depend heavily on why diesel was $8 and whether actual shortages/rationing accompanied the price increase.
Your premise about current conditions is broadly correct. EIA reports that the national average reached $6.285/gallon on September 14, up from $5.26 only five weeks earlier. U.S. distillate inventories are about 13% below the five-year seasonal average, while U.S. refineries were operating at about 97% utilization, leaving relatively little easy capacity to increase production. EIA currently expects inventories to remain unusually low, although its baseline forecast does not anticipate $8 diesel for a year: it forecasts about $5.55 in Q4 2026 and $4.40 in 2027.
The important thing about diesel is that it isn't primarily a consumer fuel. It is an input into producing and transporting almost everything else. Trucks, agricultural machinery, construction equipment, mining equipment, some rail operations, generators, and parts of industry depend on diesel. EIA specifically notes that higher diesel prices raise road and rail freight costs and affect agriculture and heating oil.
Suppose diesel otherwise would have averaged roughly $4–$5. At $8, fuel expenses for a long-haul truck could approximately double. A tractor-trailer getting 6.5 mpg would have these fuel costs:
| Diesel | Fuel cost per mile |
|---|---|
| $4 | $0.62 |
| $5 | $0.77 |
| $6 | $0.92 |
| $8 | $1.23 |
For a truck traveling 100,000 miles annually, moving from $5 to $8 adds about $46,000 per year in fuel expense.
Trucking companies cannot absorb anything close to that indefinitely. They would impose fuel surcharges and increase freight rates. Those costs would eventually work their way through Walmart, grocery stores, Amazon deliveries, construction materials, auto parts—essentially the entire physical-goods economy.
1. Another serious inflation impulse. Food would be particularly exposed because diesel appears repeatedly in its production chain: tractors and combines → trucks carrying crops → food processors → refrigerated trucks → supermarkets. Construction materials and manufactured goods would also become more expensive. This is exactly why the present diesel spike is already attracting inflation concerns.
I wouldn't assume that $8 diesel means CPI inflation rises by some mechanically fixed amount—the pass-through depends on margins, demand and monetary conditions—but sustained $8 diesel would make returning inflation to 2% considerably harder.
2. Trucking would undergo a shakeout. Large fleets usually have fuel-surcharge arrangements and hedging opportunities. Small owner-operators are much more vulnerable. Some would park trucks because certain loads would simply cease being profitable.
That creates a second-order problem: fewer available trucks → higher freight rates → higher product prices → reduced demand.
3. Agriculture would get hit unusually hard. Farmers use substantial quantities of diesel directly, particularly during planting and harvest. Diesel also affects fertilizer, trucking and other agricultural inputs. Some farmers could absorb one bad season; sustained prices for several seasons would increasingly change planting decisions and margins.
4. Construction would slow. Excavators, loaders, bulldozers, cranes and trucks consume enormous quantities of diesel. Contractors would increase bids, projects would become less economical, and some marginal projects would be postponed. That would affect both housing and commercial construction.
5. Consumers would get squeezed even if they don't own diesel vehicles. This is an important distinction from a gasoline shock. A person driving an EV doesn't escape an $8 diesel economy. They still buy food delivered by trucks, live in buildings constructed with diesel machinery, and purchase products transported through diesel-dependent supply chains.
6. The Federal Reserve would face an unpleasant dilemma. The initial shock would be supply-driven rather than excessive consumer demand. Raising interest rates doesn't manufacture diesel. But if fuel costs began feeding into wages, services and inflation expectations, the Fed could feel compelled to maintain tighter monetary policy even as economic growth weakened.
That is the classic recipe for stagflation: weak growth combined with persistent inflation.
This distinction matters enormously.
If diesel were $8 but reliably available, the economy would adapt. Freight rates would rise, companies would consolidate shipments, rail would become relatively more attractive, inefficient trucking operations would close, consumers would reduce purchases, and eventually demand destruction would help bring prices down.
If diesel were $8 and frequently unavailable, the economic consequences would be considerably worse.
A trucking company can calculate a fuel surcharge for $8 diesel. It can't operate a truck without diesel.
Actual regional shortages could therefore produce temporary disruptions in food distribution, agriculture, construction, mining and manufacturing. That's when the situation begins looking less like ordinary inflation and more like a supply-chain crisis.
I would be skeptical that the United States could maintain an $8 average for an entire year without enormous behavioral and market responses.
At $8, refiners would have an extraordinary incentive to maximize distillate production; imports would become more attractive; exports could decline; businesses would conserve fuel; trucking demand would fall; consumers would buy fewer transported goods; and weaker economic activity itself would reduce diesel consumption.
We're already seeing the first part of that process. U.S. refiners are operating near practical capacity, and current diesel refining margins are extremely high.
That's why EIA's current forecast assumes today's extraordinary conditions eventually ease rather than projecting today's price increases indefinitely.
If you specifically imposed the hypothetical "$8 national average from roughly late 2026 through late 2027", I'd think about the consequences approximately like this:
$8 but plentiful: severe cost shock → noticeably higher goods/food inflation → weaker consumer spending → trucking/agriculture/construction stress → substantially slower GDP growth and elevated recession risk.
$8 plus intermittent regional shortages: all of the above + supply-chain disruptions → substantially greater recession risk.
$8 plus persistent nationwide physical shortages/rationing: potentially a very serious recession, because the constraint would no longer simply be price. Businesses could literally be unable to move goods.
One other reason I'm concerned about the current situation is that it isn't primarily that America has run out of crude oil. EIA says U.S. distillate production this year has actually been the highest since 2019, while refineries are running near maximum utilization. The problem is unusually tight global refined-product supply, strong export demand and depleted domestic inventories. That makes this somewhat harder to fix quickly than simply increasing crude production.
So I think $8 diesel for a few weeks would be painful; $8 for twelve months would be a genuine macroeconomic event. And if the reason it remained at $8 was continuing physical scarcity rather than merely expensive crude oil, I'd be considerably more worried about the shortage than about the $8 number itself.
Can you look at this transcript of an interview with Michael Hudson: https://www.unz.com/mhudson/the-long-trajectory-of-debt-dynamics-aristocracies-war-finance-and-wealth-destruction/ . I enjoy reading his ideas but he is so long winded. Can you summarize what is saying?
Yes. I read the transcript. It is about 6,700 words, but Hudson really has one central argument, with several historical illustrations.
Debt naturally tends to grow faster than the economy's ability to pay it. If society doesn't periodically restrain, restructure, or cancel excessive debt, creditors eventually acquire an increasing share of the property and income of everyone else. That produces an oligarchy, economic stagnation, and ultimately political instability.
Hudson thinks that this is not merely something happening today. He believes it is a recurring pattern stretching back thousands of years.
Here is the argument stripped down to its essentials:
That's one of Hudson's most important ideas.
Imagine a house originally costs $200,000. Banks make more mortgage credit available, so buyers can bid $400,000. Society hasn't gained another house. Instead, the same house now carries twice as much debt.
The owner appears wealthier because the house is worth $400,000. The bank has a larger interest-bearing asset. But the next buyer has to devote much more of his income to mortgage payments.
Hudson calls much of this apparent increase in wealth financialization rather than productive wealth creation.
The middle section takes a rather unusual historical detour through medieval Europe.
Hudson argues that modern international banking developed largely because governments needed enormous amounts of money to fight wars. He places considerable emphasis on the medieval papacy, Italian bankers, the Crusades and later European monarchies. Kings borrowed to finance wars; bankers needed reliable repayment; governments consequently developed stronger systems of taxation.
Eventually city-states such as Florence and later the Dutch Republic became particularly creditworthy because they could pledge the taxing capacity of the whole population. Hudson sees this as an important step toward the modern "fiscal state": governments borrow enormous sums because creditors know governments can tax their populations to service the debt.
So Hudson sees an historical chain something like:
War → government borrowing → banking expansion → taxation to service debt → increasingly powerful financial institutions.
I would treat some of Hudson's specific claims about the medieval Church and Crusades more cautiously than his general economic argument; those are historical interpretations rather than uncontested facts.
World War I is a major turning point for Hudson.
He believes the Versailles reparations and inter-Allied debts demonstrated what happens when creditors insist that debts be paid regardless of whether the debtor economy can realistically generate the income necessary to pay them.
After World War II, Keynes wanted an international monetary system that would put pressure on both debtor and creditor countries to correct persistent imbalances. Hudson argues that the system that actually emerged—especially the IMF—became much more creditor-friendly. Countries in trouble were generally required to cut spending, privatize assets and impose austerity rather than force creditors to take losses.
Hudson thinks that same logic has now migrated from developing countries into the United States and Europe.
This is probably the part you're most interested in.
Hudson thinks Americans increasingly work not simply to consume goods and services, but to service layers of financial claims:
wages → taxes + mortgage/rent + credit cards + auto loans + student loans + health insurance + other debt service → what's left for ordinary consumption.
As debt service absorbs more household income, consumers have less money available to buy actual goods and services. Businesses therefore have less reason to expand productive capacity. Meanwhile, banks can make more money financing assets and financial transactions.
Thus, according to Hudson:
more debt → higher asset prices → greater wealth for asset owners → more interest/rent extraction → less disposable income → weaker consumer demand → less productive investment → deindustrialization.
And because the wealthy own most financial assets, the process also concentrates wealth.
This is where his politics sometimes confuses people. Hudson isn't simply saying "communism good, capitalism bad."
His argument is closer to:
China is doing something that Western industrial capitalism itself once intended to do: subordinate finance to industrial development.
He thinks China's major advantage is that the government retains much more control over banking and credit creation. Therefore it can direct credit toward infrastructure, factories, technology and industrial development instead of allowing private financial institutions primarily to inflate real estate and financial assets.
He also favors government provision or subsidization of infrastructure, transportation, communications, education and healthcare because that reduces the cost of employing workers. If a worker needs $80,000 to afford housing, healthcare, education and transportation, an employer ultimately has to generate enough revenue to support those costs. If those basic costs are lower, industry can operate more competitively.
That's actually a very old classical-economics argument, and Hudson deliberately frames it that way.
He never gives a neat ten-point program in this interview, but his prescription is pretty clear.
He wants debt write-downs when debts become economically unpayable; stronger public control over money and credit; taxation of land rents, monopoly rents and financial rents; public infrastructure; restrictions on monopolies; and a banking system oriented toward productive investment rather than asset-price inflation.
And he rejects the idea that every debt must always be paid in full.
His basic principle is essentially:
If paying the debt destroys the debtor's ability to produce, consume and invest, insisting upon full repayment ultimately hurts the creditor too.
Eventually either the debt gets written down deliberately, or the economic system writes it down involuntarily through defaults, bankruptcies, crashes and political upheaval.
Hudson believes Western economies have allowed finance to stop serving the productive economy and instead allowed the productive economy to become a vehicle for servicing debt. Ancient societies sometimes prevented this through debt cancellation; Greece and Rome didn't and became oligarchic; medieval war finance created powerful international banking systems; modern governments institutionalized creditor power; and today's enormous mortgage, corporate, consumer and government debts are increasingly extracting income instead of financing new production. Unless excessive debts are reduced and credit is redirected toward productive investment, Hudson expects Western economies to become increasingly unequal, indebted and deindustrialized. China, in his view, is outperforming the West partly because it has prevented private finance from gaining the same degree of control over credit and government policy.
One thing I find especially useful about Hudson is that you don't have to accept all of his political conclusions to find his distinction between productive credit and asset-price credit very insightful. A $10 million loan to build a factory and a $10 million loan to buy an existing $10 million building both create $10 million of bank debt, but economically they are quite different. The first can create additional productive capacity; the second primarily transfers ownership of an existing asset and may simply capitalize more debt into its price. That distinction is really at the heart of what Hudson has been arguing for decades.
Read: https://substack.com/home/post/p-213623698
In my professional opinion, what I am looking at is the privatization of the American monetary system by three men [Bessent, Lutnick, and Trump] who used government power to build it, government authority to legalize it, and government debt to fund it. And they did it in 18 months.
is it true that selenium is an antidote to mercury and fish that have a greater quantity of selenium than mercury are safe to eat in large quantities?
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercury_in_fish
The amount of mercury in tuna varies widely depending on the type and whether it is fresh/frozen or canned:
Tuna (bigeye) , frozen 0.56 ppm
Tuna (unspecified) frozen 0.34
Tuna (albacore) frozen 0.36
Tuna (albacore) canned 0.34
Tuna (yellowfin) canned 0.35
Tuna (yellowfin) frozen 0.31
Tuna (skipjack) frozen 0.15
Tuna (light) canned 0.08
Here is my conversation with Gemini:
